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CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS

ASSOCIA TION." THE

FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FACTOR VARIANCE-A
NECESSARY EVIL

INTRODUCTION

In Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., I the Supreme Court held that fundamentally different factor variances may be granted for toxic pollutants. This decision allows the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to continue to grant variances
from categorical regulations for dischargers of toxic pollutants who
demonstrate that they are fundamentally different from the other dischargers in their category.
This comment will outline the development of these variance provisions as well as the development of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (hereinafter referred to as the FWPCA), which governs those provisions. Previous judicial interpretations of the variance provisions will be
analyzed and the policy issues raised by the decision will be discussed.
This comment takes the position that the variance provisions are necessary for effective enforcement of the FWPCA.
I. BACKGROUND

A.

Legislative Background

In October 1972, the FWPCA was amended by Congress to set a
national goal of eliminating the discharge of pollutants into navigable
waters by 1985.2 Prior to 1972, regulations were aimed at aiding the
3
states to provide for enforcement of specific water quality standards.
Taking a new approach, the 1972 amendments emphasized regulations
based on discharges instead of regulations based solely on water quality.
The nature and extent of the administrative problems that the
FWPCA would provoke were not fully recognized in 1972. To provide
guidance on the character and scope of corrections that might be necessary during the first years of implementation, Congress created a National Commission on Water Quality. 4 Based on the final report of the
Commission and testimony from industry representatives, the EPA, environmental groups, scientists, and federal, state. and local officials,
Congress amended the FWPCA in the Clean Water Act of 1977. 5 The
1. 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985).

2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
3. I F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3-80 (1973).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1325 (1976).
5. The House passed H.R. 3199 on April 5, 1977, and shortly thereafter the EPA
submitted to both Houses a package of amendments approved by the Carter Administration. After further hearings in both Houses, the Senate passed S. 1952 on August 4, 1977.
At the same time, it passed H.R. 3199, completely rewritten to reflect the substance of S.
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purpose of most of the 1977 amendments 6 was to correct specific implementation problems, especially those that were raised by the provisions
dealing with toxic pollutants, 7 in order to better regulate pollution at
the point of discharge.
Congressman Ray Roberts described the amendments to Title III of
the FWPCA and its provisions dealing with toxic pollutants as "the most
important and far-reaching amendments." Indeed, to Congress, the
public and the many industries involved, these amendments were of
great concern. The principal mechanism designated for regulating the
discharge of toxic pollutants, § 307 of the FWPCA, 9 had been more difficult for the EPA to implement than Congress had expected in 1972.
Congress was unaware of the lack of information on toxicity, persistence, and bioaccumulation of pollutants. Moreover, the period of time
within which the EPA was to publish a list of toxic pollutants and promulgate regulations was unrealistically short. The promulgated standards could not be met within the time allowed for compliance and thus
posed a threat of severe economic hardship on individual plants. The
pollutant-by-pollutant regulatory approach made long-range planning
impossible for industry because standards were to be issued for pollutants that would likely require different control technologies. Faced
with these problems and concerns, the EPA was slow to implement
§ 307.10 This delay, however, upset environmental action groups, who
brought four lawsuits to compel the EPA to regulate toxics promptly
and to issue pretreatment regulations. I ' In 1975 and 1976, the EPA
developed a strategy designed both to reduce the burden on industry
and to regulate the discharge of toxic pollutants. This strategy, which
provided the basis for the settlement of the four lawsuits, was approved
in a consent decree issued by Judge Flannery of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 1976.12
The consent decree strategy was essentially adopted by Congress in
the 1977 amendments to correct the numerous problems of § 307 im1952. The bill agreed upon after further hearings, H.R. 3199, was printed on December 6,
accompanied by the Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Both Houses passed the bill by substantial majorities on December 15. Hall, The Clean
lWater Act of 1977, 11 NAT. RESOURCEs LAw. 343-72 (1978).
6. Although the amendments themselves are entitled the "Clean Water Act of
1977," § 2 of the Clean Water Act amends FWPCA § 518 to read: "This Act may be cited
as the 'Federal Water Pollution Control Act' (commonly referred to as the Clean Water
Act)." Throughout this comment, references to the "amendments" refer to the 1977
amendments and references to the FWPCA refer to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. The corresponding U.S.C. cite will be given in the footnote the first time a section of
the FWPCA is cited.
7. Toxic pollutants are defined in § 502 of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982).
8. 123 CONG. REC. H12926 (1977).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1976), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982).
10. 41 Fed. Reg. 23576-23578 (1976) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 129 (1985)). A history
of the specific problems faced by the EPA is provided by Hall, supra note 5.
11. NRDC v.Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976), modified sub nom.
NRDC v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833 (D.D.C. 1979), modified sub nom. NRDC v.
Gorsuch, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2013 (D.D.C. 1982), modified sub nom. NRDC v. Ruckelshaus, Consol. No. 2153-73 et. al. (Jan. 6, 1984).
12. NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976).

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASS'N

1986]

plementation.13 The EPA was to develop and issue effluent guidelines,
pretreatment standards, and new source performance standards for
twenty-one major industries covering sixty-five groups of pollutants by
December 31, 1979.14 These guidelines were to be implemented in accordance with §§ 301, 304, 306, and 307.15 No point source 16 was to
discharge without a permit issued by the EPA or by a state with an approved permit program under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina17
tion System (NPDES), which is set forth in § 402 of the Act.
Pretreatment standards are set forth in § 307(b) of the FWPCA. 18
Under this section, the EPA is required to designate the category or categories of dischargers to which these standards apply. Pursuant to the
consent decree and legislative intent, effluent limitations for dischargers
that expel pollutants not susceptible to treatment by sewage systems or
that interfere with the operation of those systems are regulated under
the two-phase approach applied to direct dischargers in § 301(b) 19 of
the FWPCA. 20 This approach requires that dischargers comply with the
best practicable control technology currently available (BPT) by July 1,
197721 and subsequently meet more stringent effluent standards consistent with the best available technology economically achievable (BAT).
For toxic pollutants, the BAT standard must be met by July 1, 1984. As
control technology, processes, operating methods, or other alternatives
change, the EPA is required by § 307(b)(2) to revise the pretreatment
standards following the procedure established by § 307(b).
The special provision for revising pretreatment standards is one of
the few provisions in the FWPCA allowing for the revision or modification of standards. Prior to 1972, only § 301(c), 2 2 which permits the
plant-by-plant modification of BAT standards on the grounds of eco13.

Congress sanctioned the consent decree approach to establishing pretreatment

standards for indirect dischargers. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636
F.2d 1229, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
14. All of the pollutants listed are carcinogens, suspect carcinogens, or seriously toxic
at low concentrations and are discharged by one or more of the industries. These 21
industries discharge substantial quantities of at least some of the listed pollutants.
15. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314, 1317 (1982) and §§ 1311, 1316 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
16. "The term 'point source' means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stack, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)
(1982).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (1982).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1982).
20. See NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976); H.R. REP. No.
830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 87, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4326, 4462.
21. BPT is defined as "the establishment of a range of best practicable levels, to be
based on: the average of the best existing performance by plants of various sizes, ages, and
unit processes within each industrial category."
CONG.,

IST SESS.,

A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

AMENDMENTS OF 1972 at 169 (1973).

SENATE COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93D

OF THE WATER

POLLUTION

CONTROL ACT

Although the deadline for BPT passed in 1977, the

EPA is required to issue BPT level standards as an interim measure pending development
of more stringent standards. The electroplating BPT-level pretreatment standards are
such standards.
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976).
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nomic hardship, existed as an express statutory authority for relaxing a
limitation. The 1977 amendments, however, added § 301(g) 2 3 which allows modification of BAT standards if a discharger can show that the
modification will not degrade water quality, nor result in the discharge
of pollutants that may endanger humans or the environment. The section, however, expressly provides that these modifications do not apply
24
to toxic pollutants.
Central to the controversy surrounding Chemical ManufacturersAssociation is another provision prohibiting modifications of provisions dealing
with toxic pollutants. Section 1311(1),25 added by the 1977 amendments, provides that the EPA may not modify any requirement of § 1311
as it applies to any toxic pollutant. The EPA's treatment of this provision will be examined in the next section.
B.

Administrative Background

The EPA has developed BPT, BAT, and pretreatment regulations, 26 which cover twenty-one major industry categories and sixty-five
toxic pollutants or groups of pollutants, through a series of extensive
rulemaking proceedings set out in § 307 of the FWPCA. In developing
these regulations, the EPA must take into account certain factors in
§ 304(b), such as age of equipment, age and type of facilities, and the
process employed. 2 7 The EPA compiles extensive data, including scientific information on the pollutants discharged by an industry, and establishes subcategories within the industry to reflect any differences
identified by the data among segments of the industry.
The EPA realized early in the rulemaking process that data for each
statutory factor for every discharger in an industry category could not be
obtained. Thus, establishment of accurate subcategories was not always
possible. The EPA also recognized that, if the § 304(b) factors were to
be considered in the establishment of limitations and standards applicable to a plant, a procedure for considering those factors in an individual
proceeding for plants that demonstrated that they were fundamentally
different from the plants that the EPA examined in developing the regulations was needed. With this scheme in mind, the EPA developed "fundamentally different factor" variance provisions (hereinafter referred to
28
as the "FDF variance provision").
Section 403.13 of the General Pretreatment Regulations for Existing and New Sources of Pollution, 2 9 challenged in Chemical Manufac23. 33 U.S.C. § 1 3 1 1(g) (1982) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976)).
24. Noticeably absent from the statutory scheme of the FWPCA is a BPT variance
provision. See infra notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(l) (1982) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976)).
26. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1982).
28. 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1983) is the FDF variance provision that applies to indirect
dischargers who discharge wastes into publicly owned treatment works. 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.30 (1985) is the FDF variance provision that applies to direct dischargers who discharge wastes directly into navigable waters.
29. 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1985).
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turers Association, applies to indirect dischargers. The section provides, in
relevant part, that a request for the establishment of pretreatment standards less stringent than those required by the statute shall only be approved if the requester3 0 can demonstrate that it is fundamentally
different in ways corresponding to § 304 factors. 3 ' In addition, the discharger must show that compliance with the regulations promulgated
for its category would result in costs out of proportion to the costs considered by the EPA or, in the alternative, that compliance results in a
non-water quality environmental impact more adverse than the impact
considered during development of the pretreatment standards. Section
403.13 also provides for public notice of the FDF application and a pub-

lic hearing.
Noticeably absent from the statutory scheme of the FWPCA is a
BPT variance provision. 32 Section 403.13 makes no distinction between
BPT and BAT in its variance provisions. Thus, the EPA has provided
BPT variance provisions for every category and subcategory of industrial point sources for which it has promulgated regulations. All BPT
variance provisions are similar in form, allowing for a variance from BPT
standards upon a showing that factors in existence at the individual
point source are fundamentally different from those considered by the
EPA in promulgating regulations for the point source's category. The
EPA has stated that, because § 301 (c) of the FWPCA expressly provides
for modifications of only BAT standards based on economic factors,
only non-economic technological and engineering factors will be considered in granting a BPT variance to avoid violations of § 301(c). 33 The
courts have struggled with FDF variances for BPT standards and toxic
pollutants. Pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in National Association of Metal Finishers v. EPA,34 the EPA
30. A "requester" is defined as an industrial user or other interested person seeking a
variance from the limits specified in a categorical pretreatment standard. 40 C.F.R.
§ 403.13(a) (1985).
31. Factors considered fundamentally different include the nature, quality, and volume of pollutants contained in the raw waste load of the user's process wastewater; the
energy requirements of the application of control and treatment technology; the age, size,
and land configuration as they relate to the user's facilities; and the cost of compliance
with required control technology. 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(d) (1985). Factors not considered
fundamentally different include the feasibility of installing the required equipment within
the statutory deadline and the user's ability to pay for the required equipment. 40 C.F.R.
§ 403.13(e) (1985).
32. This absence may be explained by the fact that BPT standards. designed to require the best practicable technology to be used, are not strict standards. If the technology is not practicable, then the technology is not required for compliance. BAT standards,
designed to require the best available technology to be used, are more strict. If the technology is not practicable under the BAT standards, the discharger has no alternative but
to apply for a variance stating that compliance is not practicable. Also missing from the
statutory scheme is any reference to "categories and classes of point sources" for BPT
standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(l) (1982). This omission has resulted in litigation as to
whether EPA has authority to issue regulations for BPT or whether BPT must be decided
on a plant-by-plant basis. See American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir.
1975).
33. 30 Fed. Reg. 30,073 (1974) (memorandum of Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and General Counsel).
34. See infra note 59.
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amended § 403.13 to prohibit variances for toxic pollutants. 3 5 The following section examines that decision and prior decisions interpreting
the FDF variance provisions and the FWPCA.
C. JudicialBackground
The contours of the "fundamentally different factor" variance provisions will be an active subject for future litigation over BPT.3 6 The
few district courts that have reviewed the variance provisions have rendered ambiguous and vague decisions. Consequently, appellate courts
have struggled with the precedential value and meaning of these
decisions.
The first challenge to the BPT variance provisions was in NRDC v.
EPA, 3 7 in which the NRDC argued that variance provisions violate the
congressional goal of uniformity and the goal that subcategories be the
only means of dealing with variations among dischargers. The court disagreed and held that Congress intended uniform treatment only for similar plants. The court based its decision on the fear that, in formulating
requirements for thousands of plants, the EPA would overlook the distinguishing characteristics of individual plants. Emphasizing this rationale, the majority stated that "without variance flexibility, the program
'38
might well founder on the rocks of illegality."
In 1976, the Fourth Circuit struck down the EPA's interpretation of
the BPT variances. In Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,3 9 the court held
that the BPT variance provision for steam-electric generating plants
should have included the consideration of the economic effects on individual point sources. The court held that a discharger's "economic capability" should be considered in deciding whether to grant a BPT
variance because it must be considered under § 301(c), the variance provision for BAT. 40 The court reasoned that because BPT standards were
not meant to be more stringent than BAT standards and because BAT
variances were permitted for economic reasons, variances should also be
41
allowed from BPT standards for economic reasons.
In 1976, the Fourth Circuit also decided E. I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. Train,4 2 criticizing just as it did in Appalachian Power, the EPA's
failure to consider economic factors in granting BPT variances. In E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,4 3 the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider the issue of BPT variances. DuPont had challenged the
EPA's authority under § 301 of the FWPCA to issue industry-wide regu35. 49 Fed. Reg. 5131, 5132 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 403).
36. Note, Annual Water Quality Committee Review of Significant Legislative, Judicial,and Administrative Developments in 1979: Clean Water Act, 13 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 231, 238 (1980).
37. 537 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1976).
38. Id. at 647.
39. 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
40. The EPA has stated that consideration of economic factors in granting BPT variances violates § 301(c) of the FWPCA. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41. Appalachian Power, 545 F.2d at 1359.
42. 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976).

43. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
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lations limiting discharges by existing plants. The Court held that "the
FWPCA authorizes the 1977 limitations (BPT) as well as the 1983 limitations (BAT) to be set by regulation [instead of on a plant-by-plant basis
at the permit-issuing stage], so long as some allowance is made for variations in individual plants, as the EPA has done by including a variance
clause in its 1977 limitations. ' 4 4 The Court, however, also held that the
plants that are unable to
EPA may withhold variances from individual
45
comply with the new source standards.
The rationale of DuPont is particularly difficult to understand. First,
the Court concluded that the FWPCA authorizes BPT limitations to be
set by regulation so long as some allowance is made for variations in
individual plants. The Court does not cite to any portion of the FWPCA
that expressly or impliedly makes such a statement. Thus, it appears
that the Court's reasoning is the sole basis for its conclusion. Second,
by upholding the EPA's decision to prohibit variances for plants unable
to comply with the new source standards, the Court seems to contradict
itself.4 6 Finally, the Court's discussion of Congress' intent to set limita-

tions by regulation in order to promote uniformity within a class and
category of point sources 4 7 is not reconciled with the Court's strong
statement for the allowance of variances.
The vagueness of DuPont leaves much room for differing interpretations of the Court's holding. Subsequent decisions have interpreted DuPont as holding that variances are allowable and necessary, although
DuPont easily may be read as holding just the opposite. For instance, in
Weyerhauser v. Costle,4 8 pulp and paper makers challenged the 1977 regu-

lations promulgated by the EPA. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia disagreed with the implication in Appalachian Power that
those permits that impose requirements beyond a source's economic capability are unacceptable. The court held that the fact that a discharger
could not afford to comply need not control the BPT variance decision. 49

In both Weyerhauser and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 5 0 chal-

lenged regulations

were

upheld because

the "crucial"

variance

mechanism provided the necessary flexibility. 5 1 The Fourth Circuit

again considered BPT variances in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle5 2 and,
44. Id. at 128.
45. Id. at 138.
46. There is contradiction by allowing variances from BPT requirements to account
for differences in plants but not allowing variances unless there is statutory authority for
them. There is no statutory authority allowing BPT variances (§ 301 (e) and § 301 (g) only
apply to modifications of the § 301(b)(2) BAT limitations). Perhaps the contradiction can
be resolved by reasoning that new sources are more flexible than existing sources and that
existing sources vary greatly and are not easily changed to fit rigid classifications. Thus,
the Court would rather force flexible new sources into compliance with standards that may
be impossible for misclassified existing plants to attain.
47. DuPont, 541 F.2d at 128-33.
48. 590 F.2d 1011, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
49. Id. at 1035-36.
50. 612 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1979).
51. Weyerhauser, 590 F.2d at 1040-41; Kennecott, 612 F.2d at 1243-44.
52. 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
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consistent with its decision in Appalachian Power, held that a discharger
must show both that BPT is beyond its economic capability and that the
proposed lesser reductions represented "reasonable further progress"
towards the goal of eliminating pollutant discharges. 5 3 The judicial
confusion in interpreting these provisions of the FWPCA is evidenced
by the reversal of the decision the following year.
In 1980, NRDC petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of EPA's
compliance with the 1976 Appalachian Power decision. In a case also entitled Appalachian Power Co. v. Train5 4 (Appalachian Power II), NRDC argued that Congress' enactment in 1977 of § 301(l) barred FDF
variances for toxic pollutants. The EPA argued that § 301 (1) of the Act
applied only to the § 301(c) and § 3 01(g) modifications. The Fourth
Circuit agreed and held that an FDF variance is not a modification of
applicable limitations, but instead an individual determination of the appropriate limitations. 55 Thus, the court held that § 301 (l) did not apply
to BPT variances and thereby, reflected a change in thinking after DuPont. It is evident that courts have encountered great difficulty in making consistent decisions in the face of changing statutory regulations.
In a case resembling the 1976 Appalachian Power decision, the BPT
variance question once again reached the Supreme Court from the
Fourth Circuit. In EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association,5 6 the Court
held that the EPA may withhold variances from individual polluters who
are economically unable to comply with the BPT limitations. 5 7 The
Court reasoned that Congress intended to force polluters to comply
with minimal standards or shut down. 58 Implicit in the holding was an
acknowledgment that variances from the BPT limitations for those economically able to comply are permitted.
In 1983, the Third Circuit considered the BPT variance provision.
In National Association of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 5 9 NRDC argued that
§ 301 (1) prohibits BPT variances for toxic pollutants. Reminiscent of its
argument in Appalachian Power H, the EPA argued that § 301 (1) applies
only to § 301(c) and § 301(g) modifications. The Third Circuit agreed
with NRDC and held that § 301(1) applies to BPT variances. The court
disagreed with the Appalachian Power H decision and distinguished the
DuPont decision as applying only to BPT variances and not to BAT or
60
pretreatment standards.
In 1984, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of EPA regulations promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977.61 In Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC,6 2 environmental groups filed a pe53. Id. at 244.
54. 620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980).
55. Id. at 1047.
56. 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
57. The 1976 Appalachian Power decision was not overruled on the specific point that
National Crushed Stone addressed-withholding variances for economic reasons.
58. National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 77-78.
59. 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983).
60. Id. at 644-46.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982).

1986]

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASS'N

tition to review EPA regulations 63 that allowed states to treat all of the
pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as
though they were encased within a single "bubble." 64 The regulations
were promulgated to implement § 172(b)(6) of the Clean Air Act. The
amendments, much like sections of the Clean Water Act Amendments,
require states that have not achieved the national air quality standards to
establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary
sources of air pollution. Under these regulations, an existing plant that
contained several pollution-emitting devices could install or modify one
piece of equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the alteration would not increase the total emissions from the plant. Justice Stevens, expressing the unanimous view of the Court, held that the EPA
regulations allowing states to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices
within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within
a single "bubble" were based on a reasonable construction of the term
"stationary source" in § 172(b)(6). The Court stated that Congress did
not have a specific intent as to the applicability of the "bubble concept"
and that the EPA's use of that concept was a reasonable policychoice for
the agency to make.
In 1985, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari to address the
variance issue and the EPA's interpretation of congressional intent. In
Chemical Manufacturers Association, the Court addressed many of the unresolved problems and ambiguities spawned by the complex legislative
65
and judicial history of the BPT variance provisions.
II.

FACTS OF CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION V. NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

In NationalAssociation of Metal Finishers,66 the National Association of
Metal Finishers, the Institute for Interconnecting and Packaging Electronic Circuits and Ford Motor Company filed petitions in the Court of
67
Appeals for the Third Circuit for review of the BPT-level pretreatment
standards for the electroplating point source category. 68 In the same
action, NRDC and other petitioners sought review of the electroplating
standards and of the general pretreatment regulations promulgated and
69
amended by the EPA.
62. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
63. 40 C.F.R. § 51.180)(10) (1985).
64. Hence, this method of categorization is often referred to as "the bubble concept."
65. The Supreme Court has previously upheld regulations because the provision for
exception or variance helped assure the parties of due process. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 755 (1972); FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33,
40-41 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956). Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. at 1112 n.25.
66. 791 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983).
67. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
68. Promulgated on September 7, 1979 in 44 Fed. Reg. 52,590 (1979) and amended
in 46 Fed. Reg. 9462 (1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 413.01-84 (1985)).
69. Promulgated in 43 Fed. Reg. 27,736 (1978) and amended in 46 Fed. Reg. 9404
(1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 403 (1985)).
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Among the disputed provisions of the pretreatment regulations was
the FDF variance provision set forth in § 403.13 of the General Pretreatment Regulations for New and Existing Sources of Pollution. 70 NRDC
and other petitioners sought a declaration that § 301(1)71 of the FWPCA
prohibited the EPA from issuing FDF variances for pollutants, listed as
toxic under the FWPCA, including those from electroplating operations. 72 The EPA and the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)
argued otherwise. The Third Circuit invalidated the FDF variance provision and remanded the provision to the EPA. Subsequently, the EPA
amended § 403.13 to clarify that "the pretreatment FDF variance provision is not available for toxic pollutants." ' 73 The CMA and other respondents appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the EPA
may issue an FDF variance from toxic pollutant effluent limitations
promulgated under the FWPCA.
III.

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION V. NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

In a five-to-four decision, 74 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit and held that neither legislative intent, nor the
objectives of the FWPCA precluded EPA's statutory interpretation. The
majority and dissent addressed three questions central to the FDF variance provision controversy. First, the Court considered whether the
Third Circuit was correct in ruling that § 301(1) precludes the granting
of variances for toxic pollutants to plants that can show the existence of
a factor not considered by the EPA in establishing national regulations.
Second, the Court considered whether the Third Circuit's decision was
contrary to the Court's holding in DuPont. Finally, the Court asked if the
decision below improperly removed the EPA's discretion to deal with
atypical regulatory situations and to interpret the statute governing its
regulations.
The majority based its discussion of § 301(l) on the plain meaning
of the section and the legislative history of the FWPCA. Although the
minority also relied on a plain meaning interpretation and the legislative
history, its interpretation contrasts sharply with the majority's
interpretation.
In examining the meaning of § 301(1), the majority and minority
reached two different interpretations of the phrase "may not modify any
requirement of this section." '7 5 The majority refused to read the word
70. 40 C.F.R. § 403 (1985).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(1) (1982).
72. The facts of the case do not actually state that a particular variance was applied to
a point source in the electroplating category. However, the challenged variance provision,
§ 403.13 provides for FDF variance from pretreatment standards such as those for the
Electroplating Point Source Category.
73. 49 Fed. Reg. 5131, 5132 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(a)(2)(1985)).
74. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Marshall filed the dissenting
opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Justice O'Connor joined in part of the
dissent.
75. Section 301(1) provides that "the Administrator may not modify any requirement
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"modify" broadly to encompass any change or alteration in standards.
The Court reasoned that it makes no sense to construe the statute to
forbid the EPA from amending its own standards, correcting errors, and
imposing stricter limitations. 7 6 The dissent, on the other hand, determined that the phrase proscribes all modifications of the toxic pollutant
standards. 7 7 Both opinions used congressional silence on the issue to
support their interpretations. The majority determined that congressional silence clearly proved that the § 301(l) prohibition applied only
to § 301 (c) and § 301 (g) modifications because any express intent to ap78
ply the section to FDF variances is not found in the legislative history.
The minority found that absence of such expressed intent signaled a
general, unqualified prohibition of modifications to the toxic pollutant
79
standards, including the prohibition of variances for toxic pollutants.
The majority found that § 301(l) applied only to § 301(c) and
§ 3 01(g) modifications for a number of reasons. Turning to legislative
history, the Court traced the evolution of § 301(l) to its beginnings in
the Conference Committee and determined that § 301(1) was meant to
be a clarification of the statutory language of § 301(c) and § 301(g).
The Court reasoned that because § 301(c) was in force prior to the 1977
amendments and contains no language expressly prohibiting modifications for toxic pollutants, Congress intended § 301(1), added by the
amendments, to apply to § 301(c). 80 The Court further reasoned that
because the § 301 (1)ban on waivers for toxics and the § 301 (g) ban are
similarly worded, there is little support for the argument that § 301(l)
forbids anything more than modifications for toxic pollutants. 8 1 The
dissent found this reasoning dubious and unsupported and argued that
there was no reason to believe that Congress singled out the § 301(c)
and § 301(g) modifications as more pernicious from the standpoint of
an effective toxic control program. The dissent found the converse to
be true because Congress specifically provided for exemptions in these
areas, but not in other areas. According to the dissent, those areas Congress thought most critical to the toxic control program should not con82
tain variance or modification allowances.
The dissent's strongest argument centered on the importance of the
toxic control program. Using numerous citations from legislative history, including statements from Senator Muskie (the main proponent of
the 1977 amendments), the dissent reasoned that the control of toxic
pollutants was of such importance to Congress that it did not intend to
allow any modifications of the toxic pollutant provisions. 83 Thus, the
of this section as it applies to any specific pollutant which is on the toxic pollutant list
under § 1317(a)(1) of this title." 33 U.S.C. 1311(1) (1982).
76. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. at 1108.
77. Id. at 1115 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1109.
79. Id. at 1115 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1108-09.
81. Id. at 1109 n.16.
82. Id. at 1116 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1115 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
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dissent concluded that § 301(l) was drafted and included in the 1977
84
amendments to expand the scope of prohibition against modifications.
NRDC argued that allowing FDF variances would render meaningless the § 301(1) prohibition against modification on the basis of economic and water quality factors. The majority answered this argument
by explaining that FDF variances are specifically unavailable for the
grounds that would satisfy § 301(c) and § 301(g).85 The dissent, however, did not address this issue, which had already been resolved by the
86
Court in National Crushed Stone.
In its final argument for allowance of variances, the EPA contended
that § 307(b)(2) expressly provides for revision of pretreatment standards, such as the electroplating standards, 8 7 and that an FDF variance
is more like a revision permitted by § 307 than like a § 301(c) or
§ 301(g) modification. Thus, if § 301(1) applies only to § 301(c) and
§ 301(g), the EPA argued, then § 301(1) does not apply to variances.
The majority agreed with the EPA 88 and added that § 307 also permits
the EPA to make a subcategory for a source fundamentally different
from other sources. Thus, the majority reasoned that issuing FDF variances is simply a different means of reaching the same end. 89 The dissent credited the majority with a strong argument on the § 307 issue,
but used extensive legislative history to argue that Congress intended
standards to be set and therefore revised on a categorical basis instead
of on an individual basis. 90 The dissent argued that variances are not at
all like the subcategories in § 307 because variances are granted on an
individual plant-by-plant basis. As the dissent observed, there is no
mechanism built into the variance provisions for the EPA to identify similarly situated dischargers. 9 1 Thus, the variance provisions run contrary
to the congressional objective of revision on a categorical basis.
The second major question considered in Chemical ManufacturersAssociation was whether the decision below contradicted the holding in DuPont. The majority simply stated that prohibiting FDF variances for
toxic pollutants would overrule the Court's decision in DuPont because
the regulations upheld in DuPont contained a variance clause that applied to toxic pollutants. The Court stated that Congress was obviously
aware of the DuPont decision and that, in the absence of express congressional intent, the Court should not infer that Congress meant to
84. Id. at 1117 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. Id.at 1111.
86. National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 78.
87. Supra note 18 and accompanying text.
88. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. at 1108.
89. Id. at 1111.
90. Id. at 1122-23. Senator Muskie stated that "[t]he Conferees intend that factors
described in § 304(b) be considered only within categories and classes of point sources
and that such factors not be considered at the time of the application of an effluent limitation to an individual point source within such a category or class." 118 CONG. REC. 33697
(1972). Senator Muskie did not distinguish between BAT and BPT factors, which are to be
promulgated for point sources and not for categories of point sources.
91. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. at 1123 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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amend the FWPCA to overrule DuPont.9 2 The minority disagreed with
the majority's treatment of DuPont and stated that the case did not authorize the issuance of variances in any context relevant to Chemical Manufacturers Association. 9 3 The minority reasoned that the holding in DuPont
was limited to granting variances only when BPT standards were set by
regulation. 94 Thus, the dissent stated that Congress would not have
considered DuPont or necessarily have been aware of the decision in determining whether § 301(1) applied to FDF variances.
Finally, the Court considered whether the EPA's interpretation of
the FWPCA was entitled to deference. The majority stated that the
agency charged with administration of the statute is entitled to considerable deference and that the Court need only determine that the interpretation is a rational one. The Court held that only where Congress
has clearly expressed an intent contrary to the agency's interpretation of
the statute will the Court not defer to the agency's interpretation.
Where provisions of the statute have no plain meaning, as in § 301(1),
the majority determined that such provisions are a proper subject for
agency interpretation. 95 The dissent disagreed with the majority, arguing that only when congressional intent cannot be discerned is defer96
ence required.
The dissent strongly criticized the majority for incorporating policy
considerations into its opinion. In policy matters, the dissent asserted,
the courts should defer to Congress in the first instance and then to the
97
administrative agency in the absence of a clear congressional mandate.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Courts have struggled with the issue of BPT variances and no doubt
will continue to struggle with the issue after Chemical ManufacturersAssociation. Although the Supreme Court firmly stated that BPT variances will
be allowed for toxic pollutants, the split within the Court indicates differences on many points of the issue. Moreover, neither the legislative
history, nor prior case law are of much help in resolving those
differences .98
92. Id. at 1109.
93. Id. at 1118 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Stevens authored the
majority opinion in DuPont, but joined the dissent in Chemical Mfrs. Ass 'n. Although the
majority and minority opinions in ChemicalMfrs. Ass n are sharply divided over DuPont, the
dissent may be the better indication of how the majority in DuPont wished the case to be
interpreted.
94. Id. at 1119 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95.

Id. at 1108.

96. Id. at 1121 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Indeed, perhaps the strongest indicator of the outcome was the fact that Justice
White authored the majority opinion. In the last Supreme Court decision on this issue,
National Crushed Stone, Justice White, also writing for the majority, deferred to the EPA's
interpretation of the statute. In DuPont,Justice White sided with the majority in allowing
the EPA to issue industry-wide regulations. Moreover, in a recent case, Immigration and
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983),Justice White devoted a large portion
of his dissent to the present-day trend of deferring to administrative agency interpreta-
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Both the majority and minority in Chemical Manufacturers Association
agreed that the Administrator is entitled to deference when congressional intent cannot be discerned. 99 Both opinions made various attempts to point to legislative history to prove that § 301(l) was or was
not intended to apply to FDF variances. Neither the majority nor minority, however, could find specific history to support their views. For instance, the majority's determination that § 301(l) applies only to
§ 301(c) and § 301(g) is unsupported by the legislative history. The dissent argued that Congress would have no reason to draft § 301(l) to
apply to § 301(c) and § 301(g) when Congress could have instead
amended § 301(c) and § 301(g) in 1977. Moreover, there was no reason
expressed or implied by Congress for adding § 301 (1)only a few subsections after § 301(c) and § 301(g) to merely restate § 301(g).10 0 The minority may have gotten closer to discerning the true congressional intent
by arguing that toxic pollutants were a major concern in the debates and
concluding that § 301(1) was meant to expand the prohibition of modifications for toxic pollutants. Yet, the minority could not find any evidence of an express congressional intent to apply § 301(1) to FDF
variances, which are, as the Court had decided in National Crushed Stone,
different from § 301(c) and § 301(g) modifications. If the decision in
DuPont had been clearer, Congress may have addressed this specific issue. The confusion over DuPont in Chemical Manufacturers Association
reveals the differences in the Court about the precise holding of the
case; differences that, not surprisingly, are reflective of those in Congress. In view of the lack of conclusive legislative history, the majority
made the correct decision because, as both the majority and dissent recognized, where no clear congressional intent can be discerned, the
Court must defer to the administrative agency.
The Court's decision to defer to the agency's interpretation was
consistent with the Court's earlier unanimous decision to defer to the
EPA's use of the "bubble concept" in Chevron one year earlier. Justice
Stevens expressed the Court's inclination towards deference by noting
that
[w]hen a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers . . .[and] if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.l 0 l
The Court's difficulties in finding a precise indication of congressional
intent in Chevron is not unlike the difficulties it later faced in Chemical
ManufacturersAssociation. The Chevron Court could find no specific refertions. Justice White stated that "[w]hen agencies are authorized to prescribe law through
substantive rulemaking, the administrator's regulation is not only due deference, but is
accorded 'legislative effect.' " Chadha, 462 U.S. at 986.
99. Supra notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text.
30
1(g), not § 30 1(c), states that modifications will not be allowed for tox100. Section
ics. However, there was no reason for Congress to draft § 30 1(1) to cover the inadequacy
in § 301(c) when Congress could simply have amended § 301(c).
101. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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ence to the controversial "bubble concept," nor a specific definition of
the term "stationary source" in the legislative history.' 0 2 Yet, the Court
concluded that the absence of any express congressional language on
the issue did not foreclose the EPA from basing its implementation of
the Act's proscriptions on a reasonable interpretation of the "stationary
source" designation.' 0 3 Similarly, the Court in Chemical Manufacturers
Association could find no specific reference to variance provisions in the
legislative history. Congress had no specific knowledge of FDF variances and, therefore, never specifically addressed the issue. The majority, finding no precise language about variances, deferred to the EPA.
The minority, however, reasoned that the general intent of Congress
was to regulate and almost fully curtail the discharge of toxic pollutants
into the environment. Thus, the minority concluded that this general
intent was so precise as to obviate the possibility of deference and cast
reasonable doubts upon the correctness of the EPA's interpretation.
The controversy between the majority and minority in Chemical
Manufacturers Association stems from differing interpretations of the holding in Chevron. Stated simply, the disagreement between the sides revolves around the question of "How precise is 'precise'?" In Chevron,
Justice Stevens set the standard for deference, "whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue,"' 0 4 but failed to define
"precise." However, after considering the general intent expressed in
the statements of Senator Muskie, 10 5 Justice Stevens concluded that the
intent was not sufficiently clear and deferred to the agency's interpretation. Although Justice Stevens joined the minority in Chemical Manufacturers Association, the minority failed to reconcile its opinion with Justice
Stevens' conclusion in Chevron. Thus, the question of precise intent is
still somewhat unclear. The majority, on the other hand, followed Chevron by deferring to the agency.
The minority criticized the majority for including policy issues in its
decision. Indeed, the majority was concerned with the EPA's inability to
adequately classify dischargers given the number of dischargers subject
to classification and the time constraints imposed upon the EPA. The
minority stated that such policy issues should be deferred to Congress in
the first instance and to the administrative agency in the absence of congressional mandate. 10 6 However, both opinions conceded that there
was no congressional mandate.
The EPA has promulgated its regulations relying on the variance
provisions to provide a feasible way for fundamentally different dis102. Id. at 851.
103. Id. at 861-62. The Court explained that it was not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress. "We know full
well that this language is not dispositive; the terms are overlapping and the language is not
precisely directed to the question of the applicability of a given term in the context of a
larger operation."

Id.
104. Id. at 842.
105. Id. at 853.
106. Chemical Afrs. Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. at 1114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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chargers to comply. The variance provisions not only allow the fundamentally different discharger to stay in business, but more importantly
reduce the chances of such a discharger turning to "midnight dumpers"
for disposal of wastes or polluting waterways by simply not complying
with the regulations. The variances are not an exemption from the regulations, but instead simply provide a feasible means of compliance for
fundamentally different dischargers.107
CONCLUSION

The legislative history of the FWPCA and its amendments do not
specifically discuss variances for toxic pollutants. In the absence of discernible congressional intent, both the majority and minority in Chemical
ManufacturersAssociation agreed that deference is owed to the administrative agency. By deferring to the EPA's interpretation of the FWPCA, the
Court placed the difficult decision of granting variances for toxic effluent
limitations in the bailiwick of the most competent interested party. The
variance policy provides a feasible way for misclassified plants to comply
with regulations and reduces the chances of misclassified plants being
forced into "midnight dumping," non-compliance, or bankruptcy. It
would be both unreasonable and unjust to force the closure of a misclassified plant where it can be demonstrated that the plant is economically
incapable of achieving compliance. Furthermore, if the EPA's program
of water pollution control is "[w]ithout variance flexibility, the program
might well founder on the rocks of illegality."'")
Alison L. Taylor

107. For instance, the example of Freeport Chemical Co. is evidence of the necessity of
variances. The EPA found that the Freeport plant design differed so fundamentally from
the other phosphoric acid plants in its category that the regulations when applied to Freeport allowed no discharge whatsoever. Freeport would have had to have spent $27 million
to retrofit their plant to comply with the regulations, as compared to the $500,000 spent
by the other plants in its category. Other than Freeport, only one variance has been
granted. Thus, the EPA is not granting variances indiscriminately or with any regularity.
Petitioner's Brief at 8, Chemical .1fs. .-Iss'n v. .VRDC. 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985).
108. NRDC v. EPA, 537 F.2d at 647.

